ABSTRACT
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In modern organizations, rewards based on relative performance are widely accepted as an essential component in the toolbox of incentive designers (Edward P. Lazear, 1999) .
According to estimates, a quarter of the Fortune 500 companies link parts of the individual merit of employees to a relative performance evaluation, for example by 'forced rankings' (Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert I. Sutton, 1999) . Internal promotion tournaments can also be regarded as relative performance schemes. The advantages credited to these schemes are manifold, ranging from diminishing the influence of global shocks, the sufficiency of ordinal ranking of output rather than absolute measurement, and the mitigation of hidden action problems. But incentive designers are also aware of a severe potential drawback: sabotage To overcome this problem we study sabotage behavior in a controlled laboratory experiment.
An experiment has the decisive advantage that one can precisely observe the effort and sabotage levels exerted by agents. Additionally, we are able to monitor how different design 3 characteristics of relative performance schemes ceteris paribus affect behavior (for a discussion of the power of experiments in personnel and labor economics see Armin Falk and Ernst Fehr, 2003) . In our experiment a principal can offer a tournament contract to a group of three agents. The contract specifies the total wage sum and the wage spread. The wage spread is the difference between the winner prize and the two loser prizes. The agent who obtains the highest output will be rewarded with the winner prize and the other two agents will receive the loser prize. After having seen the contract, the agents simultaneously choose (productive) effort and (destructive) sabotage. Effort increases the own output and sabotage reduces the output of the two other agents. Exerting effort and sabotage is costly for agents. The principal is rewarded proportionally to the total output reduced by a fraction of the wage costs. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first who provide clean evidence for one of the key insights from tournament theory, i.e., individual effort and sabotage levels ceteris paribus increase with the wage spread (Lazear, 1989 Fehr, Georg Kirchsteiger, and Arno Riedl, 1993 , Fehr, Simon Gächter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997 , Fehr, Erich Kirchler, Andreas Weichbold, and Gächter, 1998 , Fehr and Falk, 1999 , Fehr and Gächter, 2000 , Charness 2004 , Jordi Brandts and Charness, 2004 , Bernd Irlenbusch and Dirk Sliwka, 2005 , Charness and Peter Kuhn, 2007 The data convincingly demonstrates that the possibility to engage in sabotage induces the principal to choose smaller prize spreads since the frequency of sabotage choices is lower for low spreads. Harbring and Irlenbusch (2005, 2008) vary the number of agents, the fraction of winner prizes or the magnitude of the winner prizes (without keeping the wage sum constant).
It is shown that while tournament size has virtually no effect on behavior, a balanced fraction of winner and loser prizes appears to enhance productive activities. Higher winner prizes increase effort and sabotage, but it is not clear whether this is caused by the higher wage sum or the higher wage spread.
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In this paper, we introduce a sabotage experiment by allowing the principal to design a tournament contract along two orthogonal dimensions, the prize spread and the total sum of prizes. Sabotage might be reduced by communication between the principal and the agents or by making the agents aware that the destructive activity actually is 'sabotage'. These ways of potentially curbing sabotage are analyzed in two additional treatments. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section I, we introduce a simple tournament model that serves as the baseline for our experiment. Section II describes the experimental setting and different treatments. Section III presents our findings and section IV concludes.
I. A Simple Model of Tournaments with Sabotage
We employ a simple two-stage game with 4 players, 3 agents and one principal. As shown in 
Figure 1 about here
The principal can offer a wage contract by specifying one of two possible wage sums W ∈ {300, 600} as well as the compression of wages. In the simplest case she selects full wage compression, i.e., a fixed wage of W/3 for each agent. If unequal wages are specified we assume that the three agents compete in a tournament for a winner prize M. The two losing agents receive a loser prize m with 0 < m < M. We denote the wage spread (M -m) by ∆ with (3m + ∆) = W, i.e., the sum of winner and loser prizes equals the wage sum.
A strategy of an agent i is constituted by a pair (e i , s i ) where e i ∈ [0, …, 100] denotes effort and s i ∈ [0, …, 50] is the sabotage activity which reduces the output of the two other agents.
Exerting effort and sabotage is costly for each agent i. The costs are assumed to be symmetric 
denoting the probability for agent i to receive the winner prize if the other two agents choose effort levels i e − and sabotage activities i s − .
To provide a benchmark for behavior in the experiment let us have a look at the equilibrium prediction. For simplicity we assume that all players are rational, risk-neutral, and purely money-maximizing. 5 The expected payoff of an agent i can be written as Note that an additional unit of effort has the same effect on improving the own position in the ranking as has one additional unit of sabotage. Thus, in equilibrium the marginal costs of the two activities have to be equal. To ensure that an interior solution exists and that agents have no incentive to deviate to activities of zero, the expected gain of an agent must not be lower than his cost, i.e., *) (
. Additionally, the equilibrium effort level must lie in the feasible interval, i.e., 100 * < e . An analogous statement must hold for sabotage, i.e., 50 * < s .
We assume that the principal's expected payoff increases in the total output of the agents
τ > 0 indicates how much the principal values one unit of output. We assume that the principal suffers a cost proportionally to the promised wage sum and denote the fraction of the wage costs the principal has to bear by θ (0 < θ ≤ 1). One interpretation would be that the principal is a manager who implements the wage system and is rewarded in proportion to the output and the wage costs of his team.
Thus, in the symmetric tournament equilibrium the principal receives the following expected payoff depending on her choice of the prize spread ∆ and the total wage sum W:
.
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This reflects the standard tournament result that the principal's payoff increases with the prize spread. Note that ceteris paribus the principal's payoff is unaffected by the wage sum. If the principal anticipates the derived behavior of the agents and aims at maximizing her payoff, she chooses the highest possible wage spread and the lowest possible wage sum. Table 1 summarizes the design alternatives for the wage contracts. The principal can choose a wage sum W ∈ {300, 600} as well as one of the five prize spreads ∆ j with j = 0, …, 4. A prize spread of zero is denoted by ∆ 0 , i.e., all players receive the same fixed wage irrespective of the output they have achieved. Additionally, we allow the principal not to offer any contract at all, which results in a payoff of zero for the principal as well as all agents.
II. Experimental Design and Procedure

Table 1 about here
In the experiment, the value τ of one unit of output for the principal is set to τ = 3 and the cost parameter is set to θ = 0.3. Table 2 provides the corresponding effort and sabotage equilibrium predictions as well as the resulting expected output.
Table 2 about here
We consider five treatments. 6 We have one Baseline and two main treatments, Chat and
Framing. The three treatments exactly follow the model described so far. Two additional treatments serve as a robustness check and are only briefly mentioned. In NoSabo agents can only choose productive effort, but no sabotage. In W300 the principal cannot choose a high wage sum, i.e., the wage sum is fixed and equal to 300.
Baseline
In this treatment we avoid any value-laden terms. We do not speak of 'sabotage' or 'principal' or 'agents'. Instead we speak of players as being of type I and type II. The player of type I has to choose between a high or a low transfer and has to specify a spread. Players of type II choose two numbers A and B.
Chat
All four players are allowed to broadcast text messages during the whole game. Players cannot be individually addressed but each message can be read by all other players (including the principal). All messages appear in a communication window on the screen similar to a chat forum. Participants are not allowed to use abusive language, to reveal their real identity or to refer to any activity after the experiment.
Framing
The setting is framed as an employment situation. Roles of the 'employer' or one of the three 'employees' are assigned. The employer chooses an 'employment contract' with a 'high wage' or a 'low wage'. Employees choose a 'work' intensity and a 'sabotage' level. 
III. Results
A. Tournament Incentives
According to our analysis in section I, effort and sabotage should increase with widening the prize spread. This prediction is in line with the behavior we observe. Figures 2 and 3 show average effort and sabotage activities depending on the prize spread and the wage sum. Output results from effort and sabotage and is predicted to increase with widening the prize spread. The average output per prize spread in each treatment is depicted in Figure 4 . Model (3) in Table 3 , panel [B] confirms that output is increasing in "∆" although the actual increase appears to be rather small compared to the theoretical prediction of 0.125. Models (4) reduces the own chances of winning. Exerting higher effort serves the purpose of being kind towards the principal and at the same time increases the own chances of winning. Figure 2 indeed shows that effort is higher for the high wage sum than for the low wage sum in all three treatments. The same is not true for sabotage (see Figure 3) . The highly significant coefficients for "High Wage Sum" in Table 3 validate that effort is significantly higher for the high wage level than for low wages. We do not find a corresponding effect for sabotage.
Figures 2 and 3 about here
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OBSERVATION 2: Effort increases with the wage sum, but sabotage does not.
C. Reduction of Sabotage
Hitherto we have not analyzed possible differences between the treatments. We do so by applying the Mann Whitney U-Test (see Table 4 ). Our results indicate that sabotage is reduced by framing the situation as an employment context and explicitly using the term 'sabotage'. The results from non-parametric tests show that sabotage is significantly lower in
Framing than in Baseline particularly if high wages and fixed wages are selected. The dummy variable "Framing" is also significantly negative in models (2) in Table 3 . This reduction in sabotage leads to an increase in output as well as to an improvement of the relation of effort and sabotage (see models (3) and (4) in Table 3 and also non-parametric results in Table 4 ).
OBSERVATION 3: Framing the situation as an employment situation and explicitly calling
sabotage by its name reduces destructive activities compared to a neutral framing. To check whether the increase in effort is indeed due to reciprocity and not a repeated game effect we ran OLS regressions (with robust standard errors for groups) for last-round behavior with the same variables as depicted by Table 3 . Also in the last round effort is significantly higher for the high wage sum than for low wages, but sabotage does not differ. Additionally, we conducted a treatment W300 in which the wage sum was fixed to the low wage level of 300, i.e., the principal could only choose the prize spread, but not the wage sum. We do not find any significant differences in effort and sabotage levels between W300 and the low wage level in Baseline.
Introducing communication among the principal and the three agents has a considerable impact on behavior. Effort significantly increases and sabotage significantly decreases which ceteris paribus results in significantly higher output of roughly 17.5 (Table 3) . Also the relation of effort and sabotage is improved significantly compared to Baseline (Models (4) in Table 3 ). The regression results are all confirmed by non-parametric testing (Table 4) .
OBSERVATION 4: Communication reduces sabotage and increases effort compared to a treatment without communication.
The positive effect of the dummy variable "Chat" on effort and the negative effect on sabotage disappear in our last-round regressions which indicates that the cooperation enhancing effect of communication only survives as long as the interaction is repeated.
Whether the increases in effort and the reduction in sabotage come with different contracts chosen by the principals is investigated in the next section.
D. Contracts
Figure 5 provides the frequencies of the different contracts chosen by the principals. The contract with the largest prize spread and the low wage level favored by our analysis in section I is clearly not the most frequent choice in any of the treatments.
10 Figure 5 and Table 5 about here
Non-parametric testing of the frequencies of each contract type shows that tournament incentive contracts are more frequently chosen than fixed wages in Baseline and Framing (see Table 5 ). In Chat the high fixed wage is more frequently selected by the principal than the 10 We also conducted the treatment NoSabo in which agents could only choose effort, but no sabotage. In this setting tournament incentive contracts are selected in about 85% of the cases and the highest prize spread with the low wage level is indeed the contract which is most frequently chosen by the principal. This result is in line with the findings from Falk et al. (2008).
tournament incentive contracts with the high wage sum (Wilcoxon Signed Rank-Test, α = 0.0995, two-tailed). The high fixed wage is even chosen in almost 50% of the cases in
Chat (see Figure 5) .
Table 6 about here
While in Baseline and in Framing low wages are more often selected than high wages, the opposite is the case in Chat (Table 5 ). It seems that in Baseline and Framing the choice of contracts is closer to the theoretical prediction than in Chat: More incentive contracts are selected than fixed wages and more low wages are implemented than high wages. Table 6 shows the comparison across treatments.
OBSERVATION 5:
Communication leads participants to coordinate on high fixed wages.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Organizations are well advised to take the problem of sabotage seriously. We have unambiguously shown that agents react to increases in tournament incentives by exerting more effort, but also more sabotage. Both increases, however, seem to be less steep than suggested by theory. Secondly, and probably undervalued by standard tournament theory, our study shows that agents react reciprocally to higher wages by exerting higher effort even in the presence of tournament incentives. However, sabotage is not reduced. Making agents aware that destructive activities are in fact 'sabotage', for example by using a language that leaves no doubt about the immorality of the activity, tends to mitigate the problem. This finding might explain why codes of corporate conducts devote a considerable part of their content to advising employees against 'uncooperative' behavior within the company.
Interestingly, we find that introducing a communication device -or bringing the setting closer to reality where communication seems to be a natural option -drastically reduces the number 
